

HOW TO DESIGN AN EMOTION · WORKING PAPER 5 OF 8

The Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion: Where Appraisal Ends and Interpretation Begins

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ABSTRACT

Appraisal theories explain how a subject evaluates what an encounter means for its goals and well-being, but not how the subject constructs a determinate emotion from the feeling that the evaluation leaves open. I present the Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion (CITE), the interpretive thesis of the Constructivist Semiotic Model of Emotions. CITE holds that interpretation, rather than appraisal, constitutes emotional meaning: appraisal, prediction, categorization, and physiological affect constrain emotional possibility, and emotion arises only when an agent commits to one interpretation by binding an emotion concept to a referent under a governing goal and marking the commitment with an identifier. I compare appraisal frameworks and CITE across five structural divergences: where emotional meaning arises, where feeling stands, what role emotion concepts play, what role appraisal plays, and whether interpretive error is possible. Appraisal operates on the situation and succeeds when it gets the situation right; interpretation operates on the feeling and succeeds when its construct meets a concept's identity conditions under the goal. A worked case, one bear and two emotions, holds appraisal and feeling fixed while the emotion changes with the goal. The strongest claim is that an agent can appraise correctly and still construct the wrong emotion.

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Abstract

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Keywords: Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion; appraisal theory; interpretation; interpretive commitment; identity conditions; Component Process Model; core relational themes; James–Lange theory; two-factor theory; reappraisal; interpretive error; construal; conceptual act theory

Relation to the book. This paper restates, in new prose, Appendix L of *How to Design an Emotion: The Deconstruction and Computation of Emotional Meaning from First Principles* (Cézjah 2026, app. L), which develops the interpretive thesis of the Constructivist Semiotic Model of Emotions of Chapter 9, restated in working paper 3. A selection of the book's illustration, excerpts of its C# code, and their console input and output appear in the appendix to this paper. Every source cited here is cited in the book, with the same locators.

1. Introduction: What Appraisal Leaves Open

Appraisal theory is one of the great achievements of emotion science. It explains emotions through structured evaluations of relevance, goal relation, agency, control, and coping capacity (Lazarus 1991, 819; Scherer 2005; Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996, 241), and most appraisal frameworks locate emotion in the agent's evaluation of what a situation means for its goals, concerns, and well-being (Moors et al. 2013, 119). The book's architecture of emotion embraces that achievement (Cézjah 2026, chap. 9). It then asks the next question. After appraisal has judged that a situation matters and how, what determines which emotion the agent constructs?

The question has a specific architectural form (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Appraisal evaluates significance. But significance does not, by itself, yield a determinate emotion sign from the feeling the encounter raises. Something has to bind a concept to that feeling, and the binding has to answer to a standard, or an emotion could never be built wrongly on a correct evaluation. I call the theory that answers this question the Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion (CITE). It is the interpretive thesis of the Constructivist Semiotic Model of Emotions (CSME).

Section 2 states the thesis. Section 3 sets out five structural divergences between appraisal frameworks and CITE. Section 4 presents a worked case. Section 5 defines appraisal and interpretation by their objects, products, and conditions of success. Section 6 answers the objections the book anticipates. Section 7 places CITE among its other neighbors and states what is shared and new. Sections 8 to 10 record what CITE keeps from appraisal theory, mark the scope, and conclude.

2. The Thesis

The central claim of CITE is that meaning is made in interpretation, not in appraisal (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Several processes shape what an emotion can be: physiological affect, prediction, categorization, and appraisal itself. Each narrows the possibilities, and none fixes the meaning. The meaning is fixed when an agent takes up the feeling, binds an emotion concept to it as referent under the goal that governs the act, commits to that one interpretation, and stabilizes it with an identifier. Commitment of this kind is what turns a feeling into an emotion sign that carries meaning.

The thesis treats appraisal as necessary but not sufficient. Appraisal constrains emotional possibility; interpretation constructs emotional meaning. The two are not rivals for the same job. Appraisal determines what matters. Interpretation determines what the emotion means.

3. Five Structural Divergences

Rather than catalog appraisal theories or debate their mechanisms, I compare the two architectures at five points, each isolating a difference in how they explain emotional meaning (Cézjah 2026, app. L). One example runs through all five: the sound of rapid footsteps approaching from behind while walking alone at night.

3.1 Where Emotional Meaning Arises

Richard S. Lazarus (1922–2002) locates emotion in the appraisal of an encounter's significance for well-being. Primary appraisal determines whether the encounter bears on the agent's goals, commitments, or well-being; secondary appraisal evaluates the agent's coping resources. On his account, fear arises because the agent appraises the footsteps as threatening (Lazarus 1991). The Component Process Model (CPM) of Klaus R. Scherer (b. 1943) locates emotional differentiation in sequential appraisal: the footsteps register as novel, are evaluated for their significance to the agent's goals, then for coping potential and for compatibility with personal and social norms, and the resulting evaluative organization differentiates fear from other emotions (Scherer 2005).

CITE preserves appraisal as indispensable, because it registers that the situation matters and narrows the range of admissible emotion concepts. It denies that appraisal alone produces emotional meaning. The agent must still interpret the feeling the footsteps raise by binding a concept to the referent under a goal and marking the result with an identifier. Lazarus places emotional meaning in evaluative appraisal, Scherer in sequential appraisal, and CITE in interpretive construction.

3.2 Where Feeling Stands

The James–Lange theory, named for William James (1842–1910) and Carl Georg Lange (1834–1900), identifies emotion with the perception of bodily change (James 1884). The footsteps raise the heart rate, tighten the muscles, and quicken the breath, and fear consists in perceiving those changes. Stanley Schachter (1922–1997) and Jerome E. Singer (1934–2010) separate physiological arousal from emotional identification: the subject labels arousal in light of context, and fear emerges only after the labeling (Schachter and Singer 1962, 379). Their theory separates arousal from identification without introducing feeling as a distinct construct. Lazarus and Scherer, for their part, integrate subjective feeling within appraisal, as one of the coordinated outputs that emerge as the encounter undergoes evaluation (Lazarus 1991; Scherer 2005).

CITE assigns feeling a different role (Cézjah 2026, chap. 9, app. L). The footsteps generate physiological affect through predictive regulation of the body, and that affect becomes consciously available as feeling before the agent assigns any emotional meaning. The agent genuinely experiences tension, urgency, and heightened arousal, yet none of these specifies fear. Feeling is

neither identical with bodily change nor a component of appraisal. It is a distinct phenomenological layer that makes affect available for interpretation while remaining semantically open.

3.3 What Emotion Concepts Do

Lazarus, Scherer, and Ira J. Roseman (b. 1953) each distinguish emotions by recurring patterns of appraisal. Lazarus uses core relational themes, so that fear arises when the encounter instantiates the theme of danger to well-being (Lazarus 1991, 819). Scherer uses characteristic configurations of appraisal outcomes, so that fear emerges when an event registers as novel, goal-relevant, hard to control, and inconsistent with expectations of safety (Scherer 2005). Roseman uses combinations of appraisal variables such as motive consistency, agency, probability, control potential, and problem source (Roseman, Antoniou, and Jose 1996, 241). A review of the field puts the dependence plainly: “The number and nature of the appraisal variables and/or values is closely related to the number and nature of the emotions that one can or wishes to explain” (Moors et al. 2013, 121). None of these theories, on my reading, treats the emotion concept itself as a formal type defined by identity conditions.

CITE does (Cézjah 2026, app. L). In the footsteps case, appraisal can register urgency, danger, and personal significance, yet those evaluations do not license fear. The agent must still select a concept whose identity conditions fit the referent under the governing goal. If they are not met, the agent can still experience urgency, tension, or vigilance, but the construct does not qualify as fear. The concept supplies the type and the constructed emotion the instance; the referent fixes what the emotion is about; the goal constrains the interpretation; and the identifier stabilizes the result as a sign. The question changes from “Which appraisal pattern best differentiates this encounter?” to “Which concept licenses this emotion?” The architecture moves from evaluative differentiation to semiotic construction.

3.4 What Appraisal Does

Lazarus treats appraisal as the very process by which emotion comes about, and the CPM likewise lets the outcome of its checks tell fear apart from other emotions (Lazarus 1991; Scherer 2005). In both, a single evaluation does double duty: the appraisal that registers the footsteps as significant is also the one that decides which emotion they produce.

CITE separates the two functions (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Appraisal evaluates significance, updates urgency, and narrows the admissible concepts; it does not settle which of them the agent commits to. The same appraisal can therefore support different emotions. The same alarm at the footsteps becomes fear under the goal of staying safe, relief under the goal of meeting a friend who is due, suspicion under the goal of judging the walker, or curiosity under the goal of learning what the sound is. Appraisal determines significance; interpretation constructs emotional meaning.

3.5 Whether Interpretation Can Err

Lazarus explains emotional correction through reappraisal: if the agent first appraises the footsteps as threatening and then recognizes them as harmless, the appraisal changes and the emotion changes with it (Lazarus 1991). The CPM likewise allows revision through successive appraisal updates (Scherer 2005). On both accounts, correction runs through the evaluation of the encounter.

CITE keeps both routes and adds another (Cézjah 2026, app. L). An agent can appraise the situation correctly and still construct the wrong emotion. The agent can recognize that the footsteps are close, unexpected, and personally significant, and still commit to fear when the identity conditions of caution, curiosity, or relief better fit the referent under the governing goal. The error then lies not in the appraisal but in the commitment that bound a concept to the referent. Correction can follow without a new appraisal: the agent revises the concept, reinterprets the referent, or reconsiders the goal, and leaves the appraisal as it was. Emotional correction, on this view, need not require a new evaluation of the encounter; it can require only a different interpretation of the feeling in the same evaluated situation. Reappraisal remains available, and it remains the right route when the appraisal itself was wrong, as when an agent who first appraised the footsteps as threatening comes to recognize them as harmless, and the emotion changes with the appraisal. But a person can have every fact about the encounter right and still have misread what the feeling means under the goal she holds, and that error needs a different repair. The two acts differ even where both evaluate. Appraisal weighs what the encounter means for the organism; the agent, as interpreter, judges whether its own interpretation of the feeling succeeds under the goal it adopted.

3.6 The Divergences Together

Seen together, the five divergences trace the line between the two acts (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Each rival framework explains one piece: the James–Lange theory explains the perception of bodily change, Schachter and Singer explain cognitive attribution, and Lazarus, Scherer, and Roseman explain evaluative appraisal. CITE keeps every piece and gives each its own place in a single sequence. Regulation of the body produces affect. Feeling makes the affect available to experience. Appraisal judges significance and limits which interpretations are admissible. Interpretation then builds the emotion, as the agent binds a concept to the referent under a governing goal, commits, and marks the commitment with an identifier.

The sequence matters because each step answers to a different standard. Regulation answers to the body’s needs; feeling answers to nothing, because it asserts nothing; appraisal answers to the facts of the situation; and interpretation answers to the identity conditions of a concept under the goal the agent adopted. An account that merges any two of these steps loses one of the standards, and with it one of the ways an emotional episode can go right or wrong.

4. One Bear, Two Emotions

A single encounter puts the sequence in view (Cézjah 2026, app. L, fig. AL-1). The case adapts a famous example from James; a review of where emotional feeling is felt in the body glosses it this way: “For example, there is the distinction between running from a bear because we are afraid, and being afraid because we run” (Davey, Halberstadt, and Bell 2021, 2).

Picture two people on a forest trail, a hiker and a wildlife photographer, who round a bend and see the same bear. Their appraisals match: the animal is near, the encounter bears on their well-being, and neither has an easy way to cope. Their bodies respond alike, with a racing heart and rising arousal. Each becomes aware of that change as feeling, and that feeling, tied to this bear on this trail, is what each will interpret. So far, neither has an emotion. Both have an appraised situation and a feeling that is not yet fear, excitement, or anything else.

What separates them is the goal each brings to the act. The hiker wants to be safe. Interpreting the referent against the identity conditions of fear, the hiker judges them met and judges that fear serves safety, commits, and marks the result Fear(bear); the hiker runs. The photographer wants the picture. With an identical appraisal and an identical pulse, the photographer interprets the same referent against the identity conditions of excitement, commits, and marks the result Excitement(bear); the photographer holds still and takes an excellent photograph. Neither the appraisal nor the body differs between them. The goal differs, and so the emotion does. The book stipulates these goals and pairings for the sake of the example and makes no claim about which emotions suit which goals in actual lives.

Add a third person on the trail who brings no goal of her own to the moment. Since the architecture never leaves a system without a goal, she falls under the default one, and under it the system attributes instead of interpreting: it reads the racing heart as a sign of what the bear portends, and no emotion is constructed (Cézjah 2026, app. K).

Here CITE and appraisal theory come apart. The appraisal held constant in the example, relevant to well-being, contrary to it, and hard to cope with, is exactly the pattern Lazarus links to fear; he “hypothesized that stimuli appraised as goal relevant, goal incongruent, and difficult to cope with correspond to fear” (Moors et al. 2013, 122). If that pattern fixes the emotion, both the hiker and the photographer are afraid. CITE says that only the hiker is.

The book’s C# program for the case makes the order explicit (Cézjah 2026, app. L). It returns a stipulated appraisal and feeling. Its appraisal function evaluates the situation and returns relevance, valence, and coping, but no emotion. Its interpretation function takes the referent and the goal, commits to a concept, assigns the identifier, and only then yields the construct. Across runs under safety, under the shot, and under the default goal, the situation, appraisal, feeling, and referent are identical. What differs is the goal and what follows from it: Fear(bear) and flight;

Excitement(bear) and a photograph; or attribution only, with no identifier, no construct, and no action guided by emotion.

5. Two Acts, Defined

I define the two acts by what each operates on, what each yields, and when each succeeds (Cézjah 2026, app. L).

Appraisal takes the situation as its object. Drawing on perception and memory, it asks what the situation means for the agent's goals and concerns, and its product is significance: how relevant and urgent the situation is, what the agent can do about it, and who is responsible. It is correct when its picture of the situation is correct.

Interpretation takes the feeling as its object. With the feeling available as the referent, the agent reads it through an emotion concept under the goal that governs the act and commits to that reading. Its product is an emotion. It is correct when the resulting construct satisfies the identity conditions of its concept under that goal.

Appraisal answers whether and how the situation matters. Interpretation answers which emotion the agent constructs from the feeling. The definition by objects has support in a review of theories of emotion causation, which locates the crucial difference between emotion-antecedent appraisal and emotion-consequent attribution in their inputs: "In the case of emotion-antecedent appraisal, the input is the stimulus; in the case of emotion-consequent attribution, the input is the emotion" (Moors 2009, 638). On that account, however, attribution works on an emotion that appraisal has already produced, whereas on CITE interpretation works on a feeling that no emotion yet organizes.

The two acts come in sequence rather than side by side. Appraisal works mainly from exteroception and memory, while feeling arises from interoception (Critchley and Garfinkel 2017, 7). Interpretation draws on both: it takes the feeling together with whatever appraisal has registered about the situation, which places it above appraisal. Barrett describes a related arrangement, in which core affect arises partly from ongoing automatic evaluations and in which "The way that people conceptualize their affective state will depend on the knowledge about emotion that they bring to bear when categorizing it" (Barrett 2006, 38). The decisive break with appraisal theory comes at one point. There, the pattern of appraisal decides which emotion occurs. In CITE, the appraisal can hold steady while the emotion varies with the interpretation the agent commits to.

6. Objections and Replies

The book takes up the claims behind what is new, from the most disputable to the least (Cézjah 2026, app. L).

Objection 1: Appraisal theory was built for this case. Appraisal theorists will answer that one stimulus can bring different emotions to different people or on different occasions, and that the difference lies in the appraisal; in a review's words, "the same stimulus can lead to different emotions in different individuals or on different occasions" (Moors 2009, 640). I accept the case and dispute the explanation. If every difference in emotion is read back as a difference in appraisal, the claim that appraisal fixes the emotion can no longer fail, because appraisal becomes whatever accounts for the emotion after the fact. Critics have pressed a related charge: where appraisals enter the definitions of the emotions they are said to cause, the causal claim stops being empirical, so that "it makes no sense to empirically investigate whether fear is caused by an appraisal of danger" (Moors 2013, 136). Those critics target definitions; my point targets the habit of reading every emotional difference back into appraisal. CITE avoids both by holding the appraisal fixed. In every version of the footsteps case, the footsteps are close, unexpected, and personally significant, and what varies is the interpretation.

Objection 2: Feeling is the conscious reflection of the other components, appraisal among them. Appraisal theorists often treat feeling that way, and for those who count appraisal as a component, "appraisal is one determinant of the feeling component" (Moors et al. 2013, 121). On that view, appraisal already helps fix what is felt. On CITE, feeling is the conscious availability of changes that arise elsewhere, and it does not yet carry the verdict of any evaluation. The book answers the parallel objection in its account of emotion as a whole, with the footsteps case (Cézjah 2026, chap. 9), and the answer carries over. For CITE, the claim has a narrower job. If neither appraisal nor feeling settles which emotion the agent constructs, the act that settles it must come after both.

Objection 3: Core relational themes already do the work of identity conditions. A reader who knows Lazarus will point out that each theme states what an encounter has to be for one emotion rather than another. CITE keeps the themes and counts them among the strongest constraints appraisal places on which concepts are admissible. The difference is in what a theme can and cannot do. A theme links a pattern of appraisal to an emotion, so whenever the pattern holds, the emotion follows. It supplies no conditions the construct could fail while the pattern is in place. An emotion concept with identity conditions supplies exactly that.

Objection 4: The photographer simply appraises the bear differently, as an opportunity rather than a threat. This is Objection 1 in the case at hand. The reply reads the difference in emotion back into the appraisal, and the case is built to block that move: the appraisal it holds fixed is the one Lazarus pairs with fear.

7. What Is Shared and What Is New

Interpretation is a common word in emotion theory, and three neighbors besides appraisal theory need placing (Cézjah 2026, app. L).

The conceptual act theory of Lisa Feldman Barrett holds that an emotion is made when core affect is categorized with emotion concepts (Barrett 2006, 20, 41). That is close to CITE. The difference lies in what does the work. For Barrett, categorization is largely automatic. For CITE, emotional meaning needs an agent's commitment to one interpretation under a goal, and that commitment can be right or wrong by the concept's identity conditions.

Philosophy has its own interpretive tradition. Robert C. Roberts (b. 1942) analyzes emotions as construals, concern-shaped ways of seeing a situation as something (Roberts 1988). CITE agrees, with one revision: the thing construed is the feeling in its situation. Jan Slaby (b. 1976) holds that feeling is already directed at the world (Slaby 2008), and on this point CITE disagrees. For CITE, feeling is available before it means anything, and interpretation follows.

CITE also owes a debt to Schachter and Singer, who separated arousal from its label (Schachter and Singer 1962, 379). But a label is not yet a commitment under a goal. Rainer Reisenzein (b. 1956) later judged that the evidence supports only one of their theory's major deductions (Reisenzein 1983), and CITE does not rest on the others. The book's pair for CITE states the result (Cézjah 2026, app. L):

What is shared: emotion depends on how an agent takes a situation. What is new: interpretation as a distinct act after appraisal and after feeling, governed by identity conditions, and open to error even when the appraisal is right.

The book saves its strongest claim for last, since it concerns what the architecture is able to represent rather than how minds actually work: an agent can get the appraisal right and the emotion wrong. If appraisal fixed the emotion, a correct appraisal would leave no further step at which the emotion could fail, and every correction would have to go through reappraisal. CITE keeps reappraisal and adds a second path. Summarized, the novelty claim has four parts: appraisal and interpretation are two acts with different objects, the situation and the feeling; interpretation comes after appraisal and takes up what it registers; the emotion depends on a commitment that an emotion concept can license or refuse by its identity conditions; and so an emotion built wrongly on a correct appraisal counts as an error that reinterpretation can fix without any new appraisal. The book states that it knows of no other framework that combines all four.

8. What CITE Keeps

CITE repairs appraisal theory rather than rejecting it (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Each evaluation the theory describes still occurs, and at the place the theory assigns it; the only change is that the

evaluation no longer decides the emotion on its own. From Lazarus, CITE retains primary and secondary appraisal, the core relational themes, now serving as constraints on admissible concepts, and reappraisal as one way to correct an emotion. From Scherer, it retains the ordered checks for novelty, goal significance, coping potential, agency, and norm compatibility. From Roseman, it retains the combinations of appraisal variables that distinguish emotions. Outside appraisal theory, it retains Schachter and Singer's separation of arousal from its label and Roberts's view of emotion as a concern-shaped way of taking a situation. The review literature calls appraisal processes "the main causal determinants" of the components of an emotional response (Moors et al. 2013, 123); CITE grants them that causal role in preparing an episode and denies only that they constitute its meaning.

9. Scope and Limits

CITE is an architectural thesis about where emotional meaning is constituted, not an empirical model of appraisal mechanisms, and it does not compete with appraisal research on the measurement of appraisal dimensions. Its worked case is stipulated: the goals, the pairings of goals with emotions, and the program's values are illustrations, and they make no claim about which emotions serve which goals in human life. Its program, like the book's other programs, checks internal consistency, not truth. The theory presupposes the CSME's distinctions among affect, feeling, and emotion, argued in working paper 3 (Cézjah 2026, chap. 9), and its computational form, including the default goal, appears in working paper 4 (Cézjah 2026, app. K). How an agent can go further than correcting one emotion, and redesign the interpretive architecture that produces emotions, is the subject of working paper 6 (Cézjah 2026, app. M).

10. Conclusion

Appraisal determines what matters. Interpretation determines what the emotion means. I argued that appraisal evaluates the situation and constrains which emotion concepts are admissible, but that the emotion arises only when an agent interprets the feeling by binding a concept to it under a goal, commits, and marks the commitment with an identifier. Five divergences locate the boundary: meaning arises in interpretation, feeling is a distinct layer, emotion concepts are formal types with identity conditions, appraisal evaluates without settling the emotion, and interpretation can err when appraisal is right. The bear on the trail holds appraisal and feeling fixed while the emotion changes with the goal. The practical consequence is a second route to correction. A person who has judged the situation rightly can still have built the wrong emotion, and can rebuild it without judging the situation again. The full argument appears in Appendix L of *How to Design an Emotion* (Cézjah 2026, app. L).

Appendix: Code, UML Diagrams, and Input/Output

The figures below are the book's own diagrams in the Unified Modeling Language (UML), reproduced unchanged. The listings are excerpts from the book's C# companion projects, and the input/output blocks were captured by running those projects with the .NET 8 software development kit; I keep only the lines that bear on the argument. The full programs and the complete transcripts sit beside this paper in `code-samples/`. As in the book, the code checks the consistency of the architecture, not the truth of the theory. The figure and program come from Appendix L (Cézjah 2026, app. L). Appendix L contains no UML diagram, so none appears here.

A.1 One Bear, Two Emotions

The book's illustration pairs the same bear on the same trail with two agents under two goals (Section 4).



Figure 1. The same bear, the same trail, two goals (book Figure AL-1).

A.2 Interpretation After Appraisal and Feeling

The program fixes the situation, the appraisal, and the feeling, and varies only the goal. Interpretation operates on the referent; under the default goal, the system attributes the feeling and constructs no emotion (Sections 2 and 5).

Listing 1. The goal selects the concept; appraisal and feeling stay fixed (code/appendix-l/project-1/Program.cs, lines 97–105)

```
bool aroused = referent.Feeling.Contains("high arousal");
bool significant = referent.Appraisal.Relevance == "high";

(string concept, string action) = goal switch
{
    "safety" when aroused && significant => ("fear", "flee"),
    "shot" when aroused && significant => ("excitement", "take a great photograph"),
    _ => ("undetermined", "no action")
};
```

Listing 2. Input/output: same appraisal and feeling under three goals (code/appendix-l/project-1; captured with .NET 8)

```
$ dotnet run -- safety
Situation: bear on the trail, close
Appraisal: relevance high, valence negative, coping low
Feeling: racing heart + high arousal
Goal: safety
Referent: bear-on-trail + racing heart
SelectedConcept: fear
Identifier: Fear(bear)
Construct: this episode of fear
Action: flee

$ dotnet run -- shot
Situation: bear on the trail, close
Appraisal: relevance high, valence negative, coping low
Feeling: racing heart + high arousal
Goal: shot
Referent: bear-on-trail + racing heart
SelectedConcept: excitement
Identifier: Excitement(bear)
Construct: this episode of excitement
Action: take a great photograph

$ dotnet run -- default
Situation: bear on the trail, close
Appraisal: relevance high, valence negative, coping low
Feeling: racing heart + high arousal
Goal: default
Referent: bear-on-trail + racing heart
SelectedConcept: None (attribution only: the racing heart is attributed to the bear)
Identifier: None
Construct: None
Action: no emotion-guided action
```

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
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KEYWORDS

Constructivist Interpretation Theory of Emotion · appraisal theory · interpretation · interpretive commitment · identity conditions · Component Process Model · core relational themes · James–Lange theory · two-factor theory · reappraisal · interpretive error · construal · conceptual act theory



This paper restates, in new prose, Appendix L of *How to Design an Emotion* (Cézjah 2026, app. L). The book is the full treatment.

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