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@incollection{cezjah2026designpart1,
author = {C{\'e}zjah},
title = {Part I: The Problem of Feeling and Emotion},
booktitle = {How to Design an Emotion: The Deconstruction and Computation of Emotional Meaning from First Principles},
series = {Universal Moral Concepts},
number = {III},
publisher = {New Intellectual LLC},
address = {Miami, FL},
year = {2026},
isbn = {979-8-9898135-3-7},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23630997}
}Abstract
In Part I, I ask the question every theory of emotion must answer before it measures, models, or treats anything: what is an emotion? Philosophers and scientists have fought over it for more than two millennia, from Plato, who set desire and spirit against reason, to William James, who declared emotion the feeling of a body changing. Data is not the problem. No one decided what every answer must contain. I treat pleasure as a test case, never as a foundation. Two camps each seize half the truth. The Distinctive Feeling View rightly puts feeling before thought, but a feeling cannot interpret itself. The Attitudinal View rightly insists that we feel for reasons, but approval cannot explain why approval feels like anything at all. Their collision yields three rules. A part is never the whole: wanting and liking come apart, so no theory can fuse them. Evidence is not identity: a face, a brain signal, or a spoken report is a clue, never the emotion itself. A name is not understanding: to define anger as whatever people call anger renames the problem without solving it. An emotion requires a self-governing agent, someone who feels a change, interprets what it means, and holds that meaning to the standard of reason. So I do not start with a definition. I first set the standard every definition must meet. Because emotions stand on ideas, Part I closes on the question that opens Part II: what, exactly, is an idea?
Key concepts
- Self-governing agent
- “An emotion requires a person in command of their own mind, what I call a self-governing agent: someone who feels a change, interprets what it means, and holds that meaning to the standard of reason.” (Chapter 1)
- Distinctive Feeling View
- “According to the Distinctive Feeling View, pleasure is a feeling with a distinctive hedonic tone.” (Chapter 1)
- Attitudinal View
- “According to the Attitudinal View, pleasure consists in a favorable evaluative stance toward an experience.” (Chapter 1)
- A part is never the whole
- “You can scroll your phone at midnight and enjoy none of it, because wanting and liking come apart, and any theory that fuses them cannot explain why you chase what you do not enjoy.” (Chapter 1)
- Evidence is not identity
- “A face, a brain signal, or a spoken report is a clue, never the emotion itself.” (Chapter 1)
- A name is not understanding
- “Define anger as whatever people call anger, and you have renamed the problem, not solved it.” (Chapter 1)
Record
- self-governing agent
- Distinctive Feeling View
- Attitudinal View
- pleasure
- hedonic tone
- wanting and liking
- theory of emotion
- William James
- philosophy of emotion